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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the resilience of the Domain Name System (DNS). We study the impact on the availability of
DNS data of certain domains for the users of the Internet when parts of the DNS infrastructure become unavailable.
We perform our analysis on the level of autonomous systems and hence we explore the impact when an autonomous
system (and all the routers, name servers and resolvers located in it) fails or when interconnections between au-
tonomous systems fail. We provide a generic method to carry out this resilience analysis, in which we first identify
the domain names within the analysed domain, the autonomous systems where the name servers and resolvers for
this domain reside, and the interconnections and relations between these autonomous systems. Next, we simulate
failure scenarios to analyse the impact on the reachability of autonomous systems and the corresponding DNS data
when autonomous systems or connections between them become unavailable. Our method can identify bottlenecks
and single points of failure that should be mitigated in order to improve resilience. We demonstrate our method in a
case study for the .nl-domain and its underlying second-level domains.
Keywords: Domain Name System, Computer network reliability, Reachability analysis.
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is used to trans-
late domain names into IP addresses and as such it is
a crucial part of the infrastructure of the Internet [1].
Without the DNS, many applications and services will
not be able to map domain names on IP addresses and
consequently they will not work as intended. The spec-
ifications of the DNS therefore require that DNS data is
stored in a distributed and redundant way, preferably on
servers located in different networks connected to the
Internet, to improve the availability of DNS data in case
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of failure of some parts of the network [2]. However,
there are many physical and logical locations on the In-
ternet where something can break, either intentionally
or unintentionally, resulting in DNS data becoming un-
available. Key questions addressed in this paper are to
what extent the availability of DNS data is guaranteed
when parts of the network malfunction, and to what
extent the redundant storage of DNS data has actually
been implemented.
The Internet is not a single network, but rather a net-
work of networks [1, 3]. Each of these networks forms
an autonomous system (AS) and together these ASs
form the Internet [4]. In July 2016 there were about
54,700 ASs [5]. Each AS roughly translates to one In-
ternet Service Provider (ISP), however, there are excep-
tions as large ISPs may have a larger number of ASs [6]
and also other organisations might own an AS. An AS
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is identified by a 32-bit AS number (ASN), which is
managed and distributed by Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs) who obtain these numbers from the Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority (IANA) [7].
The DNS data is distributed over a large number of
name servers which are located in various ASs. At any
point in time an AS serving DNS data or connections
between ASs may be interrupted for various reasons.
For instance an AS may be disconnected from the Inter-
net if the company owning the AS becomes insolvent.
A connection may fail due to physical damage of the
cable connecting two routers or failure of an upstream
provider. Not only name servers may fail when a certain
AS or connection becomes unavailable, but also public
resolvers may become unreachable during such an inci-
dent, which would cause the whole DNS to be unavail-
able for users rather than only certain domain names.
Although failure of huge parts of the DNS sounds to
be a worst-case scenario, multiple incidents have shown
recently that the DNS is vulnerable and that such fail-
ures do happen. The causes of these failures ranged
from power outage and DDoS attacks to administra-
tive errors. For instance, in October 2016 a massive
DDoS attack was launched from the Mirai Internet-of-
Things botnet against DNS name servers managed by
Dyn, which consequently made numerous popular web-
sites unavailable [8]. Also many anomalies have been
identified that threaten the stability and reliability of
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Internet’s de-
fault inter-domain routing protocol that manages con-
nectivity among ASs [9]. For instance, an administra-
tive error occurred in February 2008 in Pakistan, when
routers of Pakistan Telecom were manually misconfig-
ured to announce a prefix which actually belonged to
the IP address range of YouTube. This erroneous route
was propagated to the rest of the Internet and subse-
quently all YouTube traffic was redirected to Pakistan.
This caused that the AS of YouTube was unreachable
for an estimated two-thirds of the Internet for about two
hours [10, 11]. It is well plausible that similar incidents
can occur in the future.
In this paper we analyse the resilience of the DNS.
We study the impact on the availability of DNS data of
a certain domain for the users of the Internet when parts
of the DNS infrastructure become unavailable. Our con-
tributions are twofold: (i) we provide a method to carry
out this resilience analysis, and (ii) we demonstrate our
method in a case study for the .nl-domain and its under-
lying second-level domains. Our method can be applied
to analyse whether a domain suffers from bottlenecks or
single points of failure, that should be mitigated in order
to improve resilience of this domain. We first identify
the domain names within the analysed domain, the ASs
where the name servers and resolvers for this domain
reside, and the interconnections and relations between
these ASs. Next, using a graph model of the identified
ASs, we simulate failure scenarios to analyse the impact
on the reachability of ASs and the corresponding DNS
data from the viewpoint of the most used resolvers when
ASs or connections between ASs become unavailable.
We perform our analysis on the level of ASs, which
implies that we explore the impact when an AS (and
hence all the routers, name servers and resolvers located
in this AS) fail or interconnections between ASs fail.
Although this approach is somewhat coarse grained,
more detailed analysis at the level of individual routers,
name servers or resolvers would be largely infeasible
due to their sheer numbers and missing data. We there-
fore apply a two-step approach. Whenever the analysis
at the AS level reveals issues, this pinpoints to direc-
tions where a more detailed analysis can be performed
as a second step in which only a limited number of ASs
and connections is involved. In this paper, we did not
consider such detailed analysis yet. In fact, it turned out
that in our case study for the .nl-domain, no major is-
sues were identified that would require a more detailed
analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2
we briefly provide background information on routing
and resolving of domain names to make the paper self-
contained. In section 3 we review related work. In sec-
tion 4 we outline our method for DNS resilience analy-
sis, and in section 5 we present a case study in which
we apply the method to the .nl-domain. In section 6 we
discuss limitations of our method. In section 7 we con-
clude the paper.
2. Routing and Domain Name Resolving
This section provides background information, ex-
plaining basic concepts of routing and domain name re-
solving, covering DNS and BGP, with details on Inter-
net exchanges and anycasting.
2.1. Domain Name System
In order to send a packet to a remote host over the
Internet, the IP address of that destination host must be
known. Since IP addresses are difficult to remember
and interpret by human beings, domain names were in-
troduced. The DNS translates domain names into the
corresponding IP addresses. The DNS is described in
many different RFCs which partly obsolete each other.
The most important ones are RFC 1034 [2] and RFC
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1035 [12]. The term DNS is used for both the Domain
Name System itself and the protocol used in the system.
The DNS is a distributed system in which name
servers and resolvers are the main components [2]. The
name servers form a distributed database that stores in-
formation about domain names, such as IP addresses of
hosts in that domain. Resolvers are systems capable of
querying the database in order to resolve a domain name
into an IP address. The name servers and the resolvers
are located in different ASs all over the world.
The distributed DNS database has a hierarchical tree
structure. Every name server is serving its own zone
within the domain namespace. The basis of the domain
namespace is formed by the root zone, denoted by a sin-
gle dot (.). A top level domain (TLD) is a direct child of
the root zone. In the beginnings of DNS, two types of
TLDs were introduced: ccTLDs based on country codes
from ISO 3166 [13], e.g. .nl for the Netherlands and .de
for Germany, and gTLDs based on more generic terms,
e.g. .com for commercial applications and .edu for ed-
ucational institutes [14]. The direct child domains of
a TLD are called second-level domains. Any child do-
main is a subdomain of its parent, e.g. example.nl is a
subdomain of the .nl-domain, even though the term sub-
domain is commonly only used for domains in the third
or lower level of the DNS tree. Every subdomain is del-
egated to a set of authoritative name servers serving the
DNS data of that domain. To mitigate availability is-
sues with the DNS, every zone should have at least two
distinct authoritative name servers, preferably located in
different networks [14].
When an end-user tries to resolve a particular domain
name, e.g. example.nl, a stub resolver that is built into
the application or the operating system of the user sys-
tem, asks a recursive resolver (e.g. operated by an ISP)
to perform a look-up. The recursive resolver sends a
query to one of the root name servers, asking for the au-
thoritative name servers of the TLD. The IP addresses
of these root name servers are hard-coded in the resolv-
ing software. The root name server will respond with
a referral to the name servers which serve the .nl-zone.
The recursive resolver will next query one of those name
servers in order to retrieve the IP address of example.nl,
thereby traversing the DNS hierarchy tree up to the do-
main name in question. The resolution process can
be optimised by using caching. A resolver caches re-
sponses obtained from name servers, such that these an-
swers can be reused to answer subsequent queries. It
may happen that the name servers for a particular zone
are located in the very same zone, e.g. the authoritative
name servers of example.nl might be ns1.example.nl
and ns2.example.nl. In these cases a resolver is not able
to resolve the IP addresses of the name servers, as it
needs those IP addresses to be able to query the name
servers for their own address. To circumvent this issue,
glue records are being used, that are contained in the
DNS response and specify the IP addresses of the name
servers in question. [2]
2.2. Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used by
routers (gateways) at the border of an AS to share rout-
ing information with routers at the borders of neigh-
bouring ASs [15]. Each AS owns a certain range of IP
addresses, which is denoted by prefixes according to the
concept of classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) [16].
A prefix consists of an IP address and a mask length [17]
indicating the number of fixed bits in the address. For
example the prefix 192.0.2.0/24 is used for the range
of IP addresses from 192.0.2.0 up to 192.0.2.255.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, in this pa-
per we only refer to IPv4 addresses and no IPv6 ad-
dresses [18].
The basic working of BGP is that each BGP-speaking
router at the border of an AS announces the prefixes
of the AS to its direct neighbouring routers at neigh-
bouring ASs in the network topology, which store this
announcement together with the incoming port in their
own routing table. These routers subsequently prop-
agate the announcement to their neighbouring BGP-
speaking routers, that in turn might propagate the an-
nouncement further to their neighbours, according to
their configuration and policies. This way a global rout-
ing table is created where every BGP router in theory
knows at least one path to every other AS in the net-
work topology. The propagation of announcements is
based on trust, which does not seem to be a big issue
in practice as fraud, such as announcing a prefix which
is not owned by an AS, is easily detected and trace-
able [19, 20, 21].
When transmitting a packet, a router looks up the best
route to the packet’s destination in its routing table and
forwards the packet to the next router on this path. Ev-
ery router has its own distinct routing table [1], depen-
dent on the location of the router within the Internet.
This routing data can be used to retrieve an overview of
the connectivity of the Internet [1]. Ideally, this would
allow to obtain an image of the Internet topology. How-
ever in practice not all routers have the same image of
the Internet at the same point in time, as propagation of
announcements with BGP needs some time to converge.
Each AS may have its own routing policies and
preferences, e.g. preferring one route over another.
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Figure 1: Relationships between ASs
These policies mainly rely on commercial contracts be-
tween the owners of different ASs [22]. Such contrac-
tual agreements are also used to classify the connec-
tions between ASs. Essentially, this classification boils
down to who is paying whom for providing the con-
nection. The commonly used classification scheme is
based on customer-provider, peering, and sibling rela-
tionships [22, 23]. In customer-provider relationships
the customer is paying the provider for providing up-
stream connectivity. Also transit traffic transmitted via a
provider AS has to be paid for. A provider transits traffic
for its customers, but a customer does not transit traffic
between two of its providers. In peering relationships
a pair of peers agree to exchange traffic between their
respective customers free of charge. However, peers do
not transit traffic for each other. Peering relationships
are mostly found between ASs of roughly the same size
as otherwise one AS would send considerably more traf-
fic to the other one. However, there are some excep-
tions where one peer pays another peer [24, 25, 26, 27].
In a sibling relationship the ASs have a mutual-transit
agreement and they provide connectivity to the rest of
the Internet for each other. The sibling relationship ap-
plies to ASs with common administrative boundaries,
e.g. ASs belonging to the same organisation, or to small
ISPs who are located close to each other and who cannot
afford additional Internet services for better connectiv-
ity. A sibling relationship may also provide a mutual-
backup agreement where the ASs provide backup con-
nectivity to the Internet for each other in the event that
the connection of one AS to its provider fails.
Figure 1 shows an example AS topology, using a
graph representation where nodes correspond to ASs
and edges indicate traffic flow. The form of an edge in-
dicates the relationship between the connected ASs. Di-
rected edges do not indicate a direction of the data flow,
but the direction of the money flow from the source AS
to the destination AS. In the figure, A is provider for
B and C; B is provider for D and E; C is provider for
E and F; B and C peer with each other; and, E and F
are siblings. Paths between two ASs are only valid if
every transit provider in the path is paid by one of its
direct neighbours on the path. For instance, the path
B-E-C is invalid, since E would have to provide transit
traffic without being paid for. Also, the path D-B-C-A
is invalid, since C is not being paid for providing tran-
sit traffic, while the path D-B-C-F is valid. If B and C
would have a sibling relationship instead of a peering
relationship, then the path D-B-C-A would be valid.
ASs that have connections to multiple transit
providers are called multihomed, whereas ASs with just
one transit provider are called singlehomed. Using mul-
tiple transit providers makes sense as this redundancy
ensures that the AS remains connected in case of failure
of one of the transit ASs. Routing policies may be im-
plemented to use one preferred transit provider, while
the other transit providers act as backup in case the pre-
ferred transit provider fails. The notion of singlehomed
and multihomed AS is however a bit misleading, as ev-
ery AS has to have at least two upstream providers in
order to obtain an ASN by IANA [28], however in prac-
tice a single upstream provider can be used.
Due to the interconnections between ASs and the
routes being advertised, it often happens that route loops
are created. To manage this problem, routes contain the
path of ASs that is traversed to reach a certain destina-
tion prefix. If a router receives a route with its own ASN
in the path, it can simply ignore this route.
2.3. Internet Exchanges
The European Internet Exchange Association defines
an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) as a network facility
that enables the interconnection and exchange of Inter-
net traffic between more than two independent ASs [29].
Internet Exchanges are thus central places to facilitate
ISPs to easily peer with each other. The worldwide
biggest IXPs, such as the AMS-IX in Amsterdam, DE-
CIX in Frankfurt and LINX in London, can in terms of
handled traffic even be compared to the largest Tier-1
providers in the world [30, 3]. An IXP can be consid-
ered as a giant switch where every participant connects
its own router [31]. That way, the routers of the partic-
ipants are directly connected to each other and can di-
rectly exchange routing information via BGP sessions,
which is referred to as bilateral peering. Bilateral peer-
ing however requires a separate BGP session for every
peering connection. This can be circumvented by us-
ing route servers that allow multilateral peering, where
participants establish a single BGP session with a route
server, which then broadcasts and sometimes filters ac-
cording to the operators policies all incoming routes
to the connected routers. Route servers are however
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not meant to forward any traffic [32, 3] and are there-
fore also called route reflectors. These route servers, or
rather the ASs the route servers belong to, do not ap-
pear in the path of certain routes, which makes it com-
plicated to retrieve information about the way routers
are connected to each other.
2.4. Anycasting
Anycasting means that multiple routers at differ-
ent locations within the global network topology an-
nounce the same IP address prefixes to their neighbour-
ing routers. As a result routers within different parts of
the Internet will route the traffic belonging to a certain
IP address to different networks. This shortens the mean
path length to reach a certain IP address [33].
A disadvantage of this technique is that the servers
whose routers announce the same IP address have to
stay synchronised, because otherwise the responses of
requests to the same IP address may be different accord-
ing to the network location of a client. Furthermore it
should only be used with stateless protocols as changes
in the network topology might cause the best reachable
server to change during a session. That means, that the
first packets of an established session reach a different
side than the last packets of the same session, causing
the session to be destroyed. However, the advantages
of this technique are worth the effort. Next to faster
response times due to shorter network paths, anycasting
can also be used for efficient load balancing [34] and the
introduced redundancy ensures availability of the served
data, even when one of the anycast nodes stops working.
Anycasting is therefore also used in the DNS infrastruc-
ture [35, 36, 37].
3. Related Work
A lot of previous research has focused on obtaining
the network topology of the Internet at the AS level.
This includes research by e.g. Gao [22] and Magoni
& Pansiot [38]. In this previous research different data
sources have been used for inferring the AS-level topol-
ogy of the Internet, but it is not known yet which of
these data sources produce the best image of the ac-
tual topology [39]. Although different data sources have
been utilized, they are all dependent on data collected
from the BGP which was never intended to reveal the
network topology and should therefore be used with
care [28]. Probably one of the most complete views
on the connections of ASs is given by the methodol-
ogy used by Zhang et al. [40]. Unfortunately, these
researchers discontinued their topology analysis in the
beginning of 2015. Outdated data sets dating from
September 1999 up to February 2015 are however still
available at [41].
To the best of our knowledge, no data exists which
perfectly shows the connections of ASs within the In-
ternet and up to now there is no way known to perfectly
infer this topology [42]. This is due to the way the Inter-
net is constructed. There is no authority which manages
the Internet at the topmost level. Some researchers even
stated that it is impossible to obtain this topology [42].
This may be the reason that there has been relatively lit-
tle research on this in recent years. More recently, far
less research directly aiming at inferring the network
topology has been performed, although this has been
addressed in studies with different goals, such as find-
ing critical regions and paths in a network [43]. A good
overview of research related to the inference of the net-
work topology of the Internet at the AS level is given
in a survey by Haddadi et al. [44]. Another, more re-
cent survey by Motamedi et al. [4] inventories topology
inference techniques at various levels.
Research on the resilience of the Internet, e.g. the
work performed by Rexford et al. [17], focuses mainly
on the availability of the most popular domain names,
based on the traffic received at the prefixes correspond-
ing to those domains, rather than on the availability of
the domain names within the DNS. This is however also
a very important factor, as without the DNS entries also
the servers pointed to by that DNS entry are not reach-
able, except for those users who by chance know the IP
addresses belonging to that domain.
Research on the resilience of the DNS has focused
mainly on the performance of name servers serving the
root zone [45] and not on the impact of certain fail-
ure scenarios on a TLD or even second-level domains.
Other recent research on the availability of DNS inves-
tigates DDoS attacks on the DNS [46, 47, 48].
4. Method for DNS Resilience Analysis
In this section we present our method for DNS re-
silience analysis. Our method includes 10 steps, as out-
lined in figure 2 and detailed in the following subsec-
tions. We wrote Python scripts for all steps (except step
1), and hence the method can be fully automated [49].
Since some steps are compute intensive and since the
data within the DNS and BGP routing tables are con-
stantly changing, the method cannot be performed in
real time. Therefore a copy of the required DNS and
BGP data should be made at a certain point in time,
such that the method can work afterwards for as long
as it takes with consistent data. Also, storing copies of
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1. Obtain list of domain names in zone 
2. Identify name servers 
3. Map name servers onto ASs 
4. Identify most commonly used resolvers 
5. Map resolvers onto ASs 
6. Obtain baseline graph of network topology 
7. Analyse resilience of baseline graph 
8. Identify most important ASs and interconnections 
9. Create failure graphs 
10. Analyse resilience of failure graphs 
Figure 2: Our analysis method
the data allows to rerun the analysis at later times or to
analyse differences in the data at different points in time.
4.1. Obtain List of Domain Names in Zone
The first step is to obtain a list of all domain names in
the zone that is subject of analysis. Although our analy-
sis method is generic, it is executed primarily by the
registry that manages the zone file. In our case, our re-
search was initiated by and performed at SIDN, registry
of the .nl TLD, and hence we had a copy of the zonefile
of the .nl-zone.
All DNS data published in the global DNS name-
space is in principle publicly accessible by querying the
DNS. However, the DNS is not a searchable directory,
but works more akin to a key/value store. Hence, it is
generally not possible to retrieve the full contents of a
zone through the DNS itself. Different operators have
different policies on publishing such data. For a number
of TLDs, this data is accessible through an AXFR DNS
request, which initiates a full zone transfer. Other TLDs
offer a separate download page, with usage restrictions
that the downloader needs to agree to. Yet other TLDs
keep their full zone data secret, for security or privacy
reasons.
4.2. Identify Name Servers
The zonefile contains all registered domain names
along with their name servers and possibly glue records.
The name servers in the zonefile however may not
match the name servers actually in place. Therefore,
we use the zonefile only to extract all currently reg-
istered domain names in the zone. The name servers
of a domain name and corresponding IP addresses of
these name servers can be retrieved by actively resolv-
ing the domain names of the name servers. This can
for instance be achieved with the commandline tool
dig. A more efficient way is to use a tool such as
spark [50] (developed by SIDN) that can resolve many
DNS queries in parallel.
As the metric for importance of a name server we
use the number of domain names hosted on that name
server. Other metrics could be to identify the most im-
portant domain names and the name servers that serve
these. Some domain names may have been acquired
by squatters, and hence are used rarely and could be
ignored in the analysis. However, in general it is not
evident what criteria should be applied to rank the im-
portance of domain names. Data sources such as the
Alexa-top 500 websites, or data from search engines,
social networks, advertisements, or DNS (e.g. [51])
may be considered to identify the most frequently vis-
ited domain names. An even better alternative may be to
rank according to the impact of domain names instead
of popularity. For instance, the availability of domain
names of banks or public services is more important
for private users than the domain names of their private
home pages, while the availability of domain names of
web stores and companies has direct financial impact
on their businesses. To the best of our knowledge, such
rankings however are not publicly available. We there-
fore only use the amount of domain names hosted as
the metric for importance of a name server, and not the
popularity or impact of domain names.
4.3. Map Name Servers onto ASs
We next map the IP addresses of the name servers
onto the ASs these IP addresses belong to. For each
name server, we obtain the corresponding ASN. To
better understand and be able to interpret the results
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of our analysis, we also investigated the companies
these ASNs belong to. For this purpose, the AS-to-
organization mapping provided by CAIDA [52] can be
used. This dataset is based on WHOIS data associated
with an ASN [53].
4.4. Identify Resolvers
Besides the name servers, also the (recursive) re-
solvers used to query the name servers are important,
since our goal is to analyse the reachability of authorita-
tive name servers in the case of an incident. These name
servers must be reachable from recursive resolvers. In
turn, of course, the recursive resolvers must be reach-
able for their users (i.e. stub resolvers). It is hardly pos-
sible to obtain information about stub resolvers as this
information is only available at individual user systems
and ISPs. However, the information on users and stub
resolvers is aggregated into the information of the recur-
sive resolvers, and hence our level of analysis allows to
abstract from the details at user level.
Information on recursive resolvers also is not pub-
licly available. The registry of the zone can see all
DNS queries received at its name servers, which can be
analysed to identify the resolvers that issued the queries.
As mentioned, our research was performed with SIDN,
which operates the ENTRADA database [54] in which
all DNS queries received at the authoritative name
servers of the .nl-zone are stored.
Also at the level of recursive resolvers it is nearly
impossible to analyse reachability of the authoritative
name servers for all resolvers due to the huge amount
of distinct resolvers being used. We therefore focus
on the most important ones, i.e. the resolvers that is-
sue the largest number of queries for a zone. Defin-
ing the importance of a resolver appropriately is a chal-
lenge of its own. A rather naive approach is to just
consider those resolvers that issue the most requests to
the authoritative name servers of the zone. However,
we observed that some resolvers issue large numbers of
requests automatically for various reasons. Some re-
solvers are constantly querying whole zones in a linear
fashion, either to generate profit (e.g. domainers, who
register potentially valuable domain names to sell them
later) or for research purposes [55, 56]. Other resolvers
send the same query multiple times in very short inter-
vals, which may be due to misconfiguration or absence
of caching at the resolver, or resolvers send the same
query to multiple authoritative name servers and just use
the fastest reply for optimizing the performance of the
resolver at cost of the performance of the authoritative
name servers. Also, resolvers which validate DNSSEC
entries send additional queries to name servers in order
to obtain the necessary records for validation of the re-
source records.
Hence, the challenge of selecting the most important
resolvers is to identify those resolvers that are config-
ured correctly and whose queries originate from human
users rather than automated applications. We therefore
first identify those resolvers that send basic query types
(A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, PTR, SOA, and TXT),
thereby excluding DNSSEC related requests and other
unusual query types. We remove duplicate queries, i.e.
identical queries sent in short time intervals (e.g. less
than 5 minutes) from the same resolver. Next, we ex-
clude resolvers that issue only queries of type NS as
these most probably belong to domainers. This be-
haviour would also be seen from resolvers that imple-
ment qname minimisation [57], but at the time of this
research, deployment of that technique was negligible.
We consider that resolvers are shared by many users and
the normal behaviour of resolvers therefore is that more
popular domain names are queried more often while less
popular domain names are queried only a few times a
day. We therefore exclude resolvers that act as crawlers
(i.e. resolvers that issue a high percentage of queries for
distinct domain names), resolvers that act as monitors
(i.e. resolvers that often query only a small amount of
domain names), and resolvers that act as scanners (i.e.
resolvers that scan a zone in a linear fashion). We also
exclude resolvers that cause mainly NXDomain (non-
existent domain) responses, since these are probably
used by botnets that were applying domain name gen-
eration algorithms to generate pseudo-random domain
names of which many are non-existing. The down-
side of excluding these resolvers is that also the legit-
imate queries originating from those resolvers are not
taken into account. However, the number of legitimate
queries that are dropped this way is negligible within the
greater set of legitimate queries. Nevertheless, a better
approach is to filter out the legitimate queries, which we
consider as a topic for further research.
4.5. Map Resolvers onto ASs
We map the IP addresses of the selected resolvers
onto the ASs these IP addresses belong to, in the same
way as we mapped the IP addresses of the selected name
servers onto ASs.
4.6. Obtain Network Topology of ASs and Relation-
ships
The most difficult task is to obtain an accurate net-
work topology of ASs where the selected name servers
and resolvers are located in and their relationships.
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There is no data available that perfectly represents the
Internet network topology, which is mainly due to the
fact that the Internet is a global self-managing network
without a central authority that knows everything about
the connected parties and their relationships to each
other [42]. BGP by its nature always presents an incom-
plete topology, since a BGP-speaking router forwards
only a single ’best’ route for each prefix to its neigh-
bours, according to the router’s export policy that is of-
ten determined by business relationships and therefore
kept private. Roughan et al. [28] give a detailed sum-
mary of the problems associated with inferring the AS
topology by means of BGP traffic.
To the best of our knowledge, the most complete,
publicly available view on the Internet network topol-
ogy in terms of AS relationships is currently provided
by CAIDA [23]. This CAIDA dataset provides connec-
tions inferred from several sources such as the Route-
Views project [58], RIPE RIS [59] and CAIDA’s ark
monitors [60] (see [61, 62, 63, 23] for more detailed
information and further background about the method-
ology used to infer this dataset). A big advantage of the
CAIDA dataset in contrast to other available datasets
(such as the ’Neighbours’-tool of RIPEstat [64]) is that
this dataset also provides the relationships between two
interconnected ASs, enabling us to limit our analysis to
the paths on which traffic actually might be exchanged,
rather than analysing all existing connections.
However, the CAIDA dataset has some limitations
too. Since the actual AS topology changes dynamically,
it is difficult to combine data from different sources at
different points in time. Although it is tried to syn-
chronise the data as well as possible, some errors will
be introduced. The CAIDA dataset does not specify
the locations at which peering between two neighbour-
ing ASs takes place, such as certain IXPs. We assume
that all members of an IXP peer with each other, which
is the most plausible scenario although there are some
special situations where this simple rule may not apply.
Also, the CAIDA dataset does not specify sibling rela-
tionships.
Further limitations are that we only analyse logical
connections between ASs, rather than physical links.
The latter would be more interesting as several logi-
cal connections may originate from the same physical
link. Also it is possible that several physical cables are
bundled in the same underground pipe, which might get
damaged during construction works. However, this in-
formation is kept private by the owners of physical in-
frastructure. Due to the use of anycasting, logical con-
nections may appear in the obtained topology that are
physically distributed over two different networks. (The
use of anycast is included implicitly in the AS network
topology; an AS that is applying anycast will show up
as being well connected.)
We represent the network topology in a graph model
such as shown in Figure 1, in which vertices repre-
sent ASs and edges represent connections between ASs.
The relationships between ASs are represented by labels
connected to the endpoints of each edge that indicate
whether the AS acts as customer, provider, peer, or sib-
ling on this connection. If there is evidence that peering
takes place at a certain IXP, we add a second label to
such edges that indicates the IXP.
4.7. Analyse DNS Resilience
We analyse the reachability from the ASs that con-
tain the identified most import resolvers to the ASs that
contain the name servers. Let set R contain the ASs of
the identified most import resolvers, and set S the ASs
of the name servers. For each pair (r, s) with r ∈ R
and s ∈ S we compute the shortest path in the baseline
graph from r to s. The labels attached to the edges in the
graph indicate whether a path is valid or invalid. As ex-
plained in section 2.2, a valid path is a path that consist
of zero or more customer-to-provider edges, followed
by zero or more peer-to-peer edges, followed by zero
or more provider-to-customer edges, where sibling-to-
sibling edges may occur at any position. This com-
plicates the analysis and this is not supported in stan-
dard libraries for graph analysis. We therefore im-
plemented a dedicated library to perform the required
analysis (see [49] for details).
Next to analysing whether there is a path between
two ASs, we also analyse the length of the shortest path
as a quality measure of the network. The path length
does not impact the reachability, but does impact per-
formance. This may reveal some ASs used for storing
DNS data which are poorly connected to those ASs re-
questing this data. As another quality measure also the
amount of different paths could be considered, however
this would require to compute all possible paths which
is unfeasible for large graphs.
4.8. Identify Most Important ASs and Interconnections
In the process of resolving a DNS request, three dif-
ferent sources of possible network failures can be iden-
tified:
1. failure of the resolver;
2. failure of any part of the network necessary for
transmitting the request to the authoritative name
server, i.e. transit providers or connections;
3. failure of the authoritative name server.
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Ideally one would want to know the impact of fail-
ure of any part of the infrastructure. Since our analysis
is on the level of ASs, we consider that ASs containing
resolvers, ASs providing transit, ASs containing author-
itative name servers, and interconnections between ASs
can fail. Despite this abstraction, the amount of possible
failures still is huge. We therefore focus on those ASs
that host name servers for the largest numbers of domain
names, since these ASs presumably have the highest im-
pact on the availability of DNS data. We also focus
on those ASs and interconnections that are most com-
monly traversed in the baseline, since these are the most
important transit providers and have the highest impact
on the availability of paths between resolvers and name
servers.
The criteria for selecting ASs and interconnections
can be refined further (but are outside the scope of this
paper). For instance, criteria can be considered in which
geographical location plays a role. Co-location of name
servers might be an interesting option, and one could
analyse failure of a data center and the name servers
located in that data center rather than all name servers
located in an AS. Furthermore, as a data center might
host servers located in various ASs, this would add an-
other aspect to the analysis. For interconnections, actual
physical connections such as submarine cables can be
considered that cluster logical links between ASs, and
one could analyse the impact of cutting such a cable
which might affect numerous logic links.
4.9. Create Failure Graphs
We recognize that there is vast scientific literature on
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The main
objective of FMEA is to identify potential failure modes
of different components, evaluate the causes and ef-
fects, and determine what could eliminate or reduce the
chance of failure [65]. FMEA was first developed in
the 1960s by the aerospace industry [66]. Since then,
FMEA has been extensively used in a wide range of in-
dustries, including computer networks [67].
Instead of addressing FMEA by considering failure
modes of components in the Internet, we take an aggre-
gated approach in which we abstract from components.
We consider failure scenarios in which ASs and inter-
connections fail. We consider scenarios where either
one AS fails, one interconnection fails, or multiple in-
terconnections fail that are all connected to an IXP. For
each scenario, we make a copy of the baseline graph and
remove the corresponding AS or interconnection(s).
We do not consider the failure of resolvers in our
analysis, since all ASs and domain names would be un-
reachable for a user if the AS containing the resolver
fails. It might happen that an AS serves both sides of
a DNS request, when the resolver and the authoritative
name server are located within the same AS. In these
cases no conclusions can be drawn for this particular
AS and therefore we do not consider such cases.
As mentioned before in 4.6, we apply the most com-
plete, publicly available view on the Internet network
topology in terms of AS relationships as provided by
CAIDA, which however is inherently incomplete. Con-
sequently, also our baseline graph and failure graphs
of the AS network topology with the selected name
servers, resolvers, and relationships, are inherently in-
complete. In addition, BGP-speaking routers may for-
ward back-up routes in case of failures in practice.
These back-up routes only appear in case of failure, and
are normally invisible and not part of the CAIDA data
or any publicly available dataset.
4.10. Analyse DNS Resilience with Failures
For each failure graph, we analyse whether ASs con-
taining name servers have become unreachable. We also
recompute the shortest paths between the ASs contain-
ing the identified most import resolvers and the ASs
containing the name servers. Changes in the shortest
path length indicate that the performance of the net-
work is affected. In order to reduce computations, we
cache the shortest paths in the baseline graph. When re-
computing the shortest paths in a failure graph, we first
check whether the shortest paths in the baseline graph
are affected in the failure graph. This optimisation dras-
tically reduces the number of shortest paths that have to
be recomputed, and hence the computation time.
5. Case Study of .nl
We applied our method for DNS resilience analysis
in a case study on the .nl-domain, the ccTLD of the
Netherlands, and its second-level domains.
5.1. Obtain List of Domain Names in Zone
SIDN provided a copy of the zonefile of the .nl-zone
on June 2, 2016, which contained 5,626,381 registered
domain names within the .nl-zone. We checked all these
domain names by resolving them. Some domain names
could not be resolved, because the authoritative name
server just contained the domain name without further
resource records or did not have any data at all regard-
ing that domain name [68]. Most of these errors are due
to domain names that have been registered but never
used by their owners, and therefore they are also not
well configured. In total 5,364,788 domain names could
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be resolved and we used these in our analysis. We did
not distinguish domain names by their relative usage or
worth; for the purposes of this study we considered each
domain name equally important.
5.2. Identify Name Servers
Next to the registered domain names, the zonefile also
contains the corresponding name servers and possibly
glue records. We only used the domain names from
the zonefile. We queried the DNS to obtain the name
servers for all domain names in the zonefile, and sub-
sequently to obtain the IPv4 addresses of these name
servers. By using the parallel resolving provided by
spark all required (roughly 6 million) DNS queries
could be resolved within 1.5 hours. This process could
have taken several days without parallelizing.
In total we obtained the hostnames of 69,996 name
servers. Again, it turned out that some hostnames could
not be resolved, and we excluded these name servers,
resulting in 68,060 resolvable domain names of name
servers. Further investigation revealed that some of the
domain names of name servers point to the very same
IP address, such that in fact only 45,031 distinct name
servers are responsible for serving the whole .nl-zone.
Hence, a rather small amount (roughly 45 thousand) of
name servers is utilized to serve the 5.6 million domain
names within the .nl-zone.
For 16,394 domain names, which is 0.3% of the
analysed domain names, the list of name servers speci-
fied in the .nl-zonefile did not exactly match the list of
name servers obtained by querying the DNS. This may
be due to updates that happened in the time frame be-
tween retrieval of the zonefile and querying the DNS,
or by administrators updating their infrastructures but
not their records at SIDN. These mismatches should be
investigated further, but that is out of scope for this re-
search.
On average every name server serves 311 domain
names. This however is not a uniform distribution. Only
a few name servers host most of the domain names.
The name server that hosts the most domains, serves
437,228 domain names, which is about 8% of the whole
zone. Only roughly 10% of the name servers host
more than 100 domain names. The median is 5 domain
names per name server, and almost 75% of the name
servers host less than 10 domain names. Hence, most of
the name servers just serve a small amount of domain
names.
5.3. Map Name Servers onto ASs
We mapped the IP addresses of the name servers onto
the corresponding ASs by using the GeoLite database
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Figure 3: Distribution of amount of domain names hosted on name
servers located in distinct ASs
provided by MaxMind [69]. The main advantage of this
method, in contrast to other services providing the same
information as the RIPE database [70] and the service
provided by Team Cymru [71], is that the dataset can be
downloaded and therefore the look-up of ASNs can be
done in memory, rather than issuing queries to network
services, which offers a major performance speed-up.
As a backup method, the ’Network Info’ functionality
of the RIPE database was used. The ASN lookup failed
for 31 name servers that were not included in the Max-
Mind and RIPE database.
The identified name servers are located in 3,806 dif-
ferent ASs. Also in this case, there is no uniform dis-
tribution: only a small amount of the ASs (roughly
3%) host more than 100 name servers, while the ma-
jority of the ASs (roughly 85%) host less than 10 name
servers. A similar effect can be observed in figure 3,
which shows for each of the identified ASs the amount
of domain names attributed to it. A domain name is
attributed to an AS if a name servers that hosts the do-
main name, is located within that AS. About half of the
identified ASs host less than 10 domain names.
A further interesting observation is that 1,715,627
domain names, which is 32% of the analysed domain
names, have all their name servers in a single AS.
The situation is even worse for 16,095 of these domain
names (0.3% of the analysed domain names), which
are served by a single name server and hence there is
no backup in case this name server fails. This is un-
desirable and against the requirements of SIDN, which
state that for each domain there must be a primary name
server and at least one secondary name server, and these
name servers should be redundant machines on separate
(sub)networks [72]. This situation could occur since
only the domain names of name servers have to be re-
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ported to SIDN when registering a domain name, while
these domain names still may be mapped to the same IP
address.
For each ASN, we identified the companies these
ASNs belong to using the AS-to-organization mapping
dataset provided by CAIDA [52] with some manual cor-
rections. As expected, the ASs hosting the most domain
names belong to big Dutch hosting- and infrastructure
providers, such as Schuberg Philis, TransIP, Hostnet,
and LeaseWeb. We also looked at the geographical lo-
cations of the name servers using the GeoLite Country
database by MaxMind [69]. An interesting observation
is, that although more than 75% of the domain names
within the .nl-zone are hosted in the Netherlands, less
than 50% of the name servers are geographically located
there. This indicates that those name servers hosting a
lot of the domain names are located within the Nether-
lands.
5.4. Identify Resolvers
We identified the most important resolvers for the .nl-
zone using ENTRADA [54], an open-source platform
for storing and analysing large amounts of DNS traf-
fic developed by SIDN Labs. When we performed the
analysis in the first week of June 2016, ENTRADA had
stored the DNS queries received at two out of the seven
authoritative name servers of the .nl-zone for about 2
years. In order to keep the computation time required
for data analysis within reasonable bounds, and to syn-
chronise the different data sources used in our analysis,
we only analysed the 3 billion DNS queries received in
the period June 1-7, 2016.
We performed our analysis directly at the level of
ASs. The main reason for doing so is that ENTRADA
stores the ASN of the source IP address in each DNS
query. Hence, we did not first have to identify the most
important resolvers and next map these onto ASs, but
we could select directly the ASs were most DNS queries
originated from. ENTRADA provides a simple SQL in-
terface to retrieve the stored data.
We first counted the amount of DNS queries issued
by resolvers in different ASs, and we selected the top 30
ASs with the highest counts. The resolvers in these 30
ASs issued 65% of the 3 billion analysed DNS queries.
The top 3 ASs are responsible for 26% of the DNS
queries: AS15169 owned by Google (10%), AS49544
owned by i3d (10%), and AS20857 owned by Transip
(6%).
We next filtered the DNS data as explained in sec-
tion 4.4 to obtain only those DNS queries that originated
from human users rather than automated applications.
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Figure 4: Distinct domain names queried in first week of June 2016
by resolvers
Figure 4 shows for each of the identified resolvers,
the percentage of distinct domain names queried per re-
solver in the first week of June 2016. The figure clearly
shows that there are different categories of resolvers.
For instance, about 2,000 resolvers issue queries for
domain names of which more than 70% are distinct,
while about half of the resolvers issue queries for do-
main names of which less than 30% are distinct. How-
ever, there are no strong boundaries between these cat-
egories. In our analysis we considered resolvers to be
crawlers when they query more than 90% distinct do-
main names, and we considered resolvers as monitors
when they query less than 1% distinct domain names.
We manually identified resolvers as scanners when they
generate disproportionate amounts of queries. In the fil-
tering process, we ignored small resolvers that issue less
than 10,000 queries to avoid that such resolvers would
be considered as crawlers.
The filtering excluded 61% of the DNS queries,
which illustrates that a large part of DNS queries origi-
nate from domainers, crawlers, monitors, and scanners.
We again counted the amount of DNS queries issued by
resolvers in different ASs, and selected the top 30 ASs
with the highest counts as a second set. The resolvers in
these 30 ASs issued 48% of the filtered DNS queries.
The top 3 ASs are responsible for 21% of the DNS
queries: AS15169 owned by Google (13%), AS8075
owned by Microsoft (5%), and AS32934 owned by
Facebook (3%).
An illustrative example is AS15169 operated by
Google. Figure 5 shows the percentage of distinct do-
main names queried per resolver located in this AS. In
this figure clearly three steps can be identified. The
first group of resolvers issue queries of which almost
80% or more are distinct, that can be considered as
crawlers. It turned out that these resolvers all have pre-
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Figure 5: Distinct domain names queried in first week of June 2016
by resolvers located in AS15169 operated by Google
fix 66.249.64.0/19 that is used by Googlebot [73].
The second group of resolvers issue queries of which
roughly 40% to 60% are distinct. These resolvers have
prefix 74.125.0.0/16 which is used for Google’s Pub-
lic DNS Service. These resolvers all share the same
cache, which causes that roughly half of the queries
to authoritative name servers are distinct [74]. The
third group of resolvers issue queries of which less than
25% are distinct. These resolvers can be considered
as resolvers that resolve the queries issued by regular
users. In the filtering process the first group of re-
solvers, that generate about 50% of the queries issued
from AS15169, is filtered out.
The filtered and unfiltered list of top 30 ASs show
a lot of overlap: 21 ASs occur in both lists. We com-
bined both sets, resulting in a list of 39 most important
ASs that we used in the subsequent steps. This list is
shown in table 1: the first column shows the ASN and
the second column shows that organisation that operates
the AS. The list contains ASs belonging to all kinds of
different organisations working with the DNS, such as
ISPs, hosting providers, owners of Internet infrastruc-
ture, search engines, and content providers. Hence, this
list is representative for many use cases of the DNS.
5.5. Obtain Network Topology of ASs and Relation-
ships
We inferred the topology of ASs from the dataset pro-
vided by CAIDA. This topology contained 54,466 ASs
with 488,140 connections.
5.6. Analyse DNS Resilience
We analysed the DNS resilience in the baseline AS
topology by analysing the reachability from the ASs
containing the most important resolvers (set R) to the
ASs containing the name servers (set S ). Let set S r =
Table 1: Selected resolver locations with reachability analysis in base-
line topology
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AS1103 SURFnet, The Netherlands 2 0 1.182
AS2637 Georgia Institute of Technology 3 0 2.189
AS3215 Orange S.A. 6 1 2.836
AS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG 5 1 1.819
AS3356 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 3 0 1.741
AS4134 China Telecom Backbone 1 0 2.099
AS5432 Proximus NV 1 0 2.277
AS6830 Liberty Global Operations B.V. 4 1 1.909
AS8075 Microsoft Corporation 1 0 1.645
AS8737 KPN B.V. 1 0 2.886
AS8972 PlusServer AG 1 0 2.223
AS9121 Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim
Sirketi
1 0 2.097
AS9143 Ziggo B.V. 1 0 1.940
AS13127 Tele 2 Nederland B.V. 5 1 2.037
AS13238 YANDEX LLC 2 0 1.663
AS13414 Twitter Inc. 1 0 1.791
AS13335 CloudFlare, Inc. 1 0 1.645
AS14618 Amazon.com, Inc. 1 0 2.652
AS15169 Google Inc. 4 1 1.651
AS16276 OVH SAS 3 0 1.667
AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. 1 0 1.825
AS17204 Nominum, Inc 1 0 2.359
AS20857 Transip B.V. 1 0 1.553
AS20940 Akamai International B.V. 1 0 1.621
AS23033 Wowrack.com 1 0 2.500
AS24793 NL Hosting Internet 1 0 2.223
AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 1 0 1.611
AS31615 T-mobile Netherlands bv. 1 0 2.001
AS32934 Facebook, Inc. 1 0 1.759
AS34173 SafeBrands S.A.S. 1 0 2.219
AS35470 XL Internet Services B.V. 1 0 2.639
AS36351 SoftLayer Technologies Inc. 1 0 1.495
AS36647 Yahoo 1 0 2.650
AS36692 OpenDNS, LLC 1 0 1.908
AS49544 i3d B.V. 1 0 1.711
AS55967 Beijing Baidu Netcom Science
and Technology Co., Ltd.
1 0 2.254
AS60781 LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. 2 0 1.825
AS197902 Hostnet B.V. 1 0 1.773
AS393406 Digital Ocean, Inc. 2 0 2.140
µpath 2.000
{s ∈ S |d(r, s) , ∞} (where distance d(r, s) is the length
of the shortest path between r and s) be the set of ASs
containing name servers that are reachable from r. Like-
wise, let set Ur = {s ∈ S |d(r, s) = ∞} be the set of
ASs containing name servers that are unreachable from
r. For each r ∈ R we computed three aspects:
• the amount of unreachable ASs, i.e. |Ur |
• the amount of unreachable domains, i.e. |D(Ur) \
D(S r)|, where D(S ) is the set of domain names that
are hosted on name servers located in S
• the mean of the shortest path lengths from r
to every s ∈ S r, where the path lengths are
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weighted by the number of domain names served
by name servers located in s, i.e. (
∑
s∈S r |D(s)| ·
d(r, s))/(
∑
s∈S r |D(s)|).
We used a breadth-first search algorithm that is guar-
anteed to find the shortest path between two nodes in a
graph if it exists [75]. Due to the huge size of vertices
and edges in the baseline graph, it is necessary to im-
plement some optimisation of the general breadth-first
search. Since not all pairs of vertices in the graph are
connected by a valid path and since the number of pos-
sible paths is huge, we defined a maximum path length
and stopped the search when paths contain more than
20 vertices. Ignoring paths of a certain length is justifi-
able as also the IP packets containing the DNS queries
and responses on the network layer contain a Time To
Live and do not traverse an infinite amount of machines
before being discarded. Due to the high connectivity of
the graph, most of the ASs are connected by multiple
paths of length smaller than 6. A second optimisation
is to mark a vertex once it is reached, which allows that
a vertex has not to be considered again when it is en-
countered again in the search for a path. However, next
to marking it is also necessary to store the relation by
which the vertex was reached as some shorter paths may
be invalid whereas a longer path using another relation
to reach the vertex may be valid.
Table 1 shows the baseline results in column three,
four and five. Since our topology is based on the
CAIDA data that may be incomplete, and since we lim-
ited the maximum path length to 20, it is possible that
not every AS is reachable from all other ASs in our
topology. This indeed can be observed in column three
of table 1. In fact, one AS (AS26850) is not reachable
from any resolver AS. This AS is very poorly connected
and it just has one peering connection with one other
AS. However, this only has a marginal impact on the
analysis, as this AS just contains a single name server
serving a single domain name in the .nl-zone.
Column five in table 1 shows that the mean shortest
path length varies between 1.182 and 2.886. In general
it is not the case that ASs with a larger mean shortest
path length are less well connected to the Internet. The
mean shortest path length is weighted by the number of
domain names, and hence paths to ASs hosting a large
number of domain names contribute more to the mean
than paths to ASs hosting only a small number of do-
main names. We chose to use the weighted mean short-
est path length since this incorporates the reachability of
DNS data, while using just the mean shortest path length
would be an indicator for the general connectivity of
ASs. This is also justified by figure 3, which shows that
many ASs just host a single domain name and their im-
pact on the reachability analysis should be less than the
impact of ASs that host many domain names. The av-
erage of the mean shortest path lengths for all the 39
considered resolver locations (µpath) is 2.000.
5.7. Identify Most Important ASs and Interconnections
We identified the top 20 ASs in which most domain
names are hosted (see table 2.a, in which the first col-
umn lists the ASN and the second column lists the num-
ber of domain names hosted on name servers in the
AS). We also identified the top 20 ASs that provide the
most transit connections on paths in the baseline (see
table 2.b, in which the first column lists the ASN and
the second column lists the number of paths in which
the AS occurs as transit provider). One AS (AS8455)
occurs in both lists.
We identified as well the interconnections between
ASs that are most traversed in the baseline (see table 2.c,
in which the first column lists the interconnection and
the second column lists the number of paths that include
the interconnection).
5.8. Analyse DNS Resilience with Failures
We analysed the following failure scenarios:
• failure of an AS in the top 20 of ASs in which the
most domain names are hosted
• failure of an AS in the top 20 of ASs that provide
the most transit connections on paths in the base-
line
• failure of an interconnection in the top 20 of the
most traversed connections in the baseline
• failure of the AMS-IX, implying that all peering
interconnections at the AMS-IX fail.
We analysed the DNS resilience in each failure sce-
nario by recomputing the reachability analysis on the
failure graph in which the failing AS or interconnection
is removed. The results are shown in the columns three
to six of table 2.
The third column (#res.) in the table shows the num-
ber of resolver locations affected. This number indicates
the number of resolver locations out of the 39 most im-
portant resolver locations shown in table 1, that are af-
fected. Affected means that the number of unreachable
ASs increases compared to the baseline (not counting
the AS that is removed in the failure scenario).
The fourth column (µAS ) and the fifth column (µdom)
show the average number of ASs and the average num-
ber of domain names that become unreachable (where
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Table 2: Results of failure scenarios
a. Top 20 ASs hosting most domain names
ASN #domains #res. µAS µdom µpath
AS20857 1,102,720 0 0 0 2.086
AS60781 910,200 0 0 0 2.049
AS21155 554,539 39 1 1 1.986
AS12859 554,182 0 0 0 2.065
AS8455 491,008 39 5 11,475 2.046
AS197902 458,068 0 0 0 2.015
AS25151 291,815 0 0 0 2.003
AS24940 248,358 0 0 0 2.022
AS48635 235,129 39 1 34,770 2.003
AS3265 234,512 0 0 0 2.004
AS35470 206,455 0 0 0 1.974
AS15879 199,021 0 0 0 1.998
AS25459 187,562 0 0 0 2.000
AS6724 172,155 39 1 0 2.004
AS49544 149,090 38* 4 1,425 2.020
AS34233 148,421 0 0 0 1.997
AS61387 130,468 0 0 0 1.989
AS8315 113,760 0 0 0 2.002
AS50673 112,783 39 3 515 2.016
AS25525 99,106 39 1 15 2.001
b. Top 20 ASs providing most transit paths
ASN #paths #res. µAS µdom µpath
AS174 22,165 39 11 95 2.040
AS2914 17,849 39 4 3 2.037
AS1299 13,140 39 7 114 2.023
AS3356 12,932 15* 8 22 2.010
AS6453 6,693 0 0 0 2.001
AS3320 6,345 38* 2 1 2.007
AS20562 5,011 1 1 0 2.049
AS6939 4,861 39 5 10 2.011
AS43531 4,374 39 1 0 2.007
AS10310 4,026 39 102 137,560 1.932
AS4436 3,990 2 1 0 2.000
AS49685 3,946 39 101 178,110 1.923
AS8455 3,716 39 5 11,475 2.046
AS5511 3,649 14 110 83,677 2.107
AS16509 3,592 14 108 83,359 2.059
AS9002 3,473 39 1 0 2.001
AS8220 3,192 39 10 29 2.001
AS1136 2,997 39 41 51,101 2.106
AS3257 2,982 7 1 0 2.002
AS701 2,856 39 6 11 2.000
c. Top 20 ASs connections most traversed
connection #paths #res. µAS µdom µpath
AS35470-AS49685 3,842 39 99 173,999 1.923
AS10310-AS36647 3,842 39 99 137,559 1.932
AS1299-AS23033 3,594 0 0 0 2.015
AS14618-AS16509 3,594 14 108 71,124 2.048
AS3215-AS5511 3,479 0 0 0 2.021
AS17204-AS2914 3,128 0 0 0 2.016
AS2914-AS5432 3,041 0 0 0 2.012
AS1136-AS8737 2,826 0 0 0 2.028
AS31615-AS3320 2,681 0 0 0 2.002
AS24793-AS41887 2,657 14 107 59,305 2.004
AS1299-AS2637 2,634 0 0 0 2.003
AS55967-AS6453 2,396 0 0 0 2.001
AS30781-AS34173 2,250 0 0 0 2.002
AS43531-AS9143 2,225 1 3 1 2.004
AS2914-AS393406 2,087 1 1 0 2.003
AS174-AS2914 2,084 0 0 0 2.000
AS197902-AS8455 2,047 0 0 0 2.003
AS3320-AS8972 1,892 0 0 0 2.001
AS1136-AS286 1,869 0 0 0 2.004
AS1299-AS13127 1,800 0 0 0 2.005
* Actually one more resolver AS is affected, but this is left out since it
coincides with the failing AS (see section 4.9).
the mean is calculated over the affected resolver loca-
tions mentioned in the third column (#res)). In table 2.a
and 2.b the numbers in the fourth column (µAS ) do not
include the AS that is removed as it is clear that this AS
will become unavailable for all other ASs. Likewise, the
numbers in the fifth column (µdom) do not include the
domain names which are hosted exclusively on name
servers in the removed AS. Hence, these numbers are
exclusive the ASs and domains which are expected to
become unreachable (or already are unreachable in the
baseline).
The sixth column (µpath) shows the mean shortest
path length in each failure scenario. This mean is cal-
culated over all resolver locations, and hence it can be
compared to the mean shortest path length (2.000) in the
baseline.
In the following subsections we outline the main re-
sults. Detailed results for each failure scenario are avail-
able in [49].
5.8.1. Failure of ASs
The results for failure of ASs that host most domain
names in table 2.a indicate that in 13 of the 20 failure
scenarios no resolvers are affected (except of course that
the failing AS and the domain names hosted exclusively
on this AS become unreachable). In the other 7 fail-
ure scenarios all resolver locations are affected, however
still only small numbers of ASs become unreachable.
Only the failures of AS8455 and AS48635 cause that a
substantial amount of domain names becomes unreach-
able (which however still is a neglectable percentage of
all domain names). Furthermore, the mean length of the
shortest path to reach the AS hosting a domain name
slightly increases for a subset of the resolvers. In some
cases this mean length decreases a little, which is rather
a side effect of calculating the mean over fewer domain
names as some domain names are not reachable any-
more. We conclude that failure of an AS that hosts many
domain names in general has a minor impact.
The results for failure of ASs that provide most tran-
sit traffic in table 2.b however show a different picture.
Resolvers are affected in 19 of the 20 failure scenar-
ios and larger numbers of ASs and domain names be-
come unreachable. The reachability of domain names
depends highly on the location of the resolver trying
to access a certain domain name. For example in the
scenario when AS10310 fails, AS36647 is completely
cut off from the rest of the network and hence all 5.3
million domain names become unreachable for the re-
solvers in this AS. The same holds when AS49685 fails
which causes that AS35470 is completely cut off. Also
the cases when AS5511, AS16509 and AS1136 fail
are interesting as in these cases the resolvers located
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in AS3215, AS14618 and AS8737, respectively, loose
their connection to roughly half of the ASs where name
servers are located, resulting in roughly 1.1 million un-
reachable domain names.
AS8455 is in both the top 20 of ASs serving most do-
main names and in the top 20 of ASs providing most
transit traffic, and hence is an interesting case. Figure 6
shows the ASs and domain names that become unreach-
able when AS8455 fails. The figure shows respectively:
the number of ASs and domain names that were al-
ready unreachable from the 39 selected ASs in the base-
line; AS8455 itself and the domain names served solely
by AS8455 that become unreachable; and, the number
of ASs and domain names that become unreachable in
addition due to the failure of AS8455. Although the
amount of additional unreachable ASs is limited, the
amount of additional unreachable domain names is con-
siderable. This indicates that some domain names can
be resolved only by name servers that are all located
in the same unreachable AS (or by just a single name
server in an unreachable AS).
5.8.2. Failure of connections
The results for failure of connections between neigh-
bouring ASs in table 2.c show that removal of a single
connection in general does not break anything as in 14
out of the 20 cases no ASs and thus no domain names
other than those which are already unreachable in the
baseline become unreachable.
In some situations however, the connection is very
important for the reachability of certain ASs. AS35470-
AS49685 and AS10310-AS36647 are the only connec-
tions for AS35470 and AS36647 to the rest of the net-
work.
The failure of connection AS174-AS2914 does not
have any impact at all, and even the mean shortest path
length is unaffected. This would be the desired situation
for all scenarios, as this suggests that the network offers
alternative shortest paths of the same length.
5.8.3. Failure of the AMS-IX
We also analysed the failure of an IXP. We chose the
AMS-IX since this is the largest IXP of the Netherlands
and the majority of the Dutch ASs are members of the
AMS-IX. In the failure scenario of AMS-IX we assume
that all peering connections between the 769 member
ASs are removed. Surprisingly, this leads to only a
few changes in the amounts of unreachable ASs or do-
main names. In fact, the only resolvers affected are lo-
cated in AS3320 (for which 116 ASs and 6,096 domain
names become unreachable) and in AS3356 (for which
57 ASs and 1,406 domain names become unreachable).
However, the mean length of the shortest path between
the AS of the resolver and the AS of the name servers
(µpath) increases to 2.291, as shown in figure 7. The
figure shows the mean length of the shortest path to
reachable domains from the selected ASs containing re-
solvers, both for the baseline and in case AMS-IX fails.
The increase in shortest path length is as expected, since
now the traditional customer-provider links have to be
utilised. In terms of pure reachability, the impact of the
AMS-IX failing is thus quite small and only the mean
shortest path length increases significantly. In practice
however, there would still be availability issues as the
available bandwidth of the remaining customer-provider
links is not taken into account and these might become
overloaded.
6. Discussion
To what extent our observations are realistic, is hard
to judge. This is mainly due to the incompleteness of
the underlying data regarding the AS topology. How-
ever, in our case study we did not observe any serious
issues for the .nl-domain, and this observation would
have been even stronger in case of more complete info
on the AS topology. In case issues would have been
observed, it would have been questionable how realis-
tic these findings would have been. If this will hap-
pen when analysing other domains, more effort will
be required to validate the findings. For instance, the
data from looking glasses can be used as an additional
source, but in case of deviations the question will re-
main which data source is more reliable.
A further limitation of our analysis is that we only
consider logical connections between ASs and ignore
physical links. ASs may be connected via multiple
physical links which show up as a single logical con-
nection. In case one such physical link fails, only the
bandwidth of the connection would be affected, but the
logical connection would still be in place. On the other
hand, a single physical link may also bundle multiple
logical connections, and in that case failure of a single
link would imply that multiple logical connections are
affected. Also, a single logical connection may be phys-
ically distributed over two different networks in case of
anycasting. We did not consider physical connections
and bandwidth, mostly since there are no accurate, pub-
licly available data on these, but it would be an interest-
ing and valuable improvement of our method.
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Figure 6: Reachability of ASs and domain names when AS8455 fails
7. Conclusion
We presented a generic method to analyse resilience
of the DNS infrastructure by investigating the impact
when certain parts of the Internet’s infrastructure fail.
Although the method is hampered somewhat by the lim-
ited information about the Internet’s infrastructure, we
demonstrated in our case study that it can already be
applied to a ccTLD and its second-level domains. An
interesting follow-up study would be to compare the re-
sults obtained for the .nl-domain with other domains.
Our case study of the .nl-domain shows that the avail-
ability of most of the domain names in the .nl-zone is
not at risk. This is largely in line with expectations. Our
results show that most ASs have multiple connections
to the Internet, and hence failure of a single connection
has only a minor impact. However, we identified some
ASs that are poorly connected, and also a substantial
amount of domain names that are hosted solely on name
servers within the same AS or in some extreme cases
even on a single name server. Hence, these ASs and do-
main names are vulnerable and could become unreach-
able due to a single failure. Most of the issues occur
only in extraordinary circumstances, when a complete
AS fails, and can be circumvented by hosting the data
on name servers located in different ASs.
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